The Politics of Security in Modern Russia by Mark Galeotti

Author:Mark Galeotti [Galeotti, Mark]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781282454187
Goodreads: 16928681
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing
Published: 2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

Analysis: How and Why?

Could Russia find strategic security with smaller nuclear forces? In this section, two below-SORT forces for Russia and for the United States are hypothesised and then statistically interrogated. In the first case, each state is assigned a triad of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and bombers, within an upper limit of 1,000 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. This force will stand in as a candidate ‘minimum deterrent’ force. In the second case, Russia and the United States will each be assigned a triad of forces within the lower limit of 500 operationally deployed warheads. The second force will represent a ‘micro deterrent’ force. For each state, decisions about future deployments are notional, and not necessarily predictive of actual deployments. Nevertheless, judgments put forward here are ‘in the ballpark’ with respect to political and military feasibility and past experience.16

The strategy of analysis proceeds in three phases. First, the numbers of surviving and retaliating second-strike warheads for Russia and for the United States are calculated for each force size. These calculations are made for each of four different force structures for the US and for Russia. The various US forces are: (1) a balanced triad of land-based, sea-based and air-delivered weapons; (2) a dyad without land-based missiles (ICBMs); (3) a dyad without bombers; and (4) a force composed entirely of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). For Russia, the optional force structures include: (1) a balanced triad of land- and sea-based missiles and bombers; (2) a dyad without bombers; (3) a dyad without SLBMs; and (4) a force composed entirely of ICBMs.

In addition, the results of these nuclear exchanges are also modelled for each of four conditions of operational readiness and launch doctrine: (1) strategic nuclear forces are on generated alert, and launched on warning of attack; (2) forces are on generated alert, and ride out the attack before retaliating; (3) forces are on day–to-day alert and are launched on warning; and (4) forces are on day-to-day alert and ride out the attack. In principle, the numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads for each state should be maximised in the ‘generated alert, launch on warning’ condition; minimised in the ‘day-to-day alert, ride out the attack’ posture; and fall into an intermediate zone in either the ‘generated alert, riding out the attack’ condition or in the ‘day-to-day alert, launch on warning’ posture.

However, this principle does not always apply in practice, depending upon the actual kinds of forces deployed and their performances relative to those of their opponents. It is also the case that Russian and US forces might be in different operational conditions at the same phase of a nuclear crisis. Added to the complexity of the situation is that different arms of service have technical or other biases toward specific kinds of doctrines. For example, ballistic missiles forces have the advantage of promptness in delivery once launched, but lack the flexibility of recall that bombers have. On the other hand, the ability of bomber forces to survive is highly dependent on early warning in order to scramble a survivable portion of the force.

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